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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-'JUDICIAL DEFERENCE-SUPREME COURT
WILL DEFER To "REASONABLE" ABORTION RESTRICTIONS. Rust v.
Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
On February 2, 1988, the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (Secretary) issued amended regulations prohibit-
ing projects funded by Title X of the public Health Services Act from
providing abortion counseling or referrals and requiring that such
projects be physically and financially separate from abortion-related
activities.1 In response to these regulations two separate actions were
I. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), affd, I II S. Ct. 1759 (1991). Title
X was enacted by Congress in 1970 as part of the Family Planning Services and Population
Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-8
(1988)). Title X authorizes the Secretary to make grants to public or nonprofit private entities to
assist in the establishment and operation of family planning projects. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a). Under
42 U.S.C. § 300a-4 all grants must be made in accordance with regulations promulgated by the
Secretary. In 1988 the Secretary issued amended regulations for Title X projects which specifi-
cally addressed § 300a-6 of the Act. Section 300a-6 provides that "[n]one of the funds appropri-
ated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family plan-
ning." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6. The amended regulations can be found at 42 C.F.R. § 59 (1991).
The following sections of the regulations are most relevant to this discussion:
A Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a
method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family
planning.
42 C.F.R § 59.8(a)(1) (1991).
A Title X project must be organized so that it is physically and financially sepa-
rate, as determined in accordance with the review established in this section, from ac-
tivities which are prohibited under section 1008 of the Act and § 59.8 and § 59.10 of
these regulations from inclusion in the Title X program. In order to be physically and
financially separate, a Title X project must have an objective integrity and indepen-
dence from prohibited activities. Mere bookkeeping separation of Title X funds from
other monies is not sufficient. The Secretary will determine whether such objective in-
tegrity and independence exist based on a review of facts and circumstances. Factors
relevant to this determination shall include (but are not limited to):
(a) The existence of separate accounting records;
(b) The degree of separation from facilities (e.g. treatment, consultation,
examination, and waiting rooms) in which prohibited activities occur and the
extent of such prohibited activities;
(c) The existence of separate personnel;
(d) The extent to which signs and other forms of identification of the
Title X projects are present and signs and material promoting abortion
absent.
42 C.FR. § 59.9 (1991).
A Title X project may not encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of
family planning. This requirement prohibits actions to assist women to obtain abortions
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filed against the Secretary in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York,2 seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief to prevent the new regulations from being implemented.' The ac-
tions were consolidated,4 and the district court subsequently enjoined
enforcement of the regulations, with respect to the plaintiffs, until fur-
ther order. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court
determined that the regulations were a permissible construction of the
statute, and that they did not violate the constitutional rights of Title X
grantees or their patients.5
or increase the availability or accessibility of abortions for family planning purposes.
Prohibited actions include the use of Title X project funds for the following:
(1) Lobbying for the passage of legislation to increase in any way the
availability of abortion as a method of family planning;
(2) Providing speakers to promote the use of abortion as a method of
family planning;
(3) Paying dues to any group that as a significant part of its activities
advocates abortion as a method of family planning;
(4) Using legal action to make abortion available in any way as a
method of family planning; and
(5) Developing or disseminating in any way materials (including printed
matter and audiovisual materials) advocating abortion as a method of family
planning.
42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1991).
"Title X is the single largest source of federal funding for family planning services." Jerry V.
McMartin, Family Planning Means Never Having to say "'Abortion": Analysis of Title X Anti-
Abortion Regulations, at *4, October 1990, available in WestLaw, TP-AII Database.
This Act is popularly known as Title X, referring to its designation as Title X of chapter 373
of Pub. L. No. 91-572 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300).
2. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 406. The original two cases were New York v. Bowen,
No. 88-0701 (S.D.N.Y.) and Rust v. Bowen, No. 88-0702 (S.D.N.Y.). The defendant in both
lawsuits was Otis R. Bowen, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services at
that time.
The plaintiffs in New York v. Bowen were the State of New York (a grantee of Title X
funds), the City of New York (a provider of services to Title X grantees in New York City), and
the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (a provider of hospital services to the low
income population of the City).
The plaintiffs in Rust v. Bowen were Dr. Irving Rust and Dr. Melvin Padawer (supervisors of
Title X funded programs) and Planned Parenthood of New York City and Planned Parenthood of
Westchester/Rockland (Title X grantees). New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1263
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aftd, Rust v. Sulli-
van, III S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
Plaintiffs contended that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary were not a proper
construction of the Act and that they violated the First Amendment constitutional rights of Title
X grantees and their patients and the Fifth Amendment constitutional rights of the Title X pro-
ject patients. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 404.
3. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 406.
4. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1263.
5. Id. at 1272-74. The district judge noted that two other district courts had reviewed the
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Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
which affirmed the district court's decision. 6 Once again, plaintiffs'
statutory and constitutional arguments challenging the validity of the
regulations were rejected.7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari8 to hear this case in order
to resolve a split among the circuits. 9 In a five-to-four decision the Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit holding that
the regulations were a proper interpretation of the Act and that their
interpretation did not violate the First or Fifth Amendment rights of
Title X grantees or their patients. 10 Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991).
In Rust v. Sullivan the Supreme Court addressed an issue it has
faced repeatedly since Roe v. Wade" in 1973: To what extent may
state legislatures or the executive branch restrict the right to an abor-
tion? 2 To understand Rust v. Sullivan in its proper context it is neces-
sary to trace the evolution of the Supreme Court cases involving the
regulation of abortion.
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court invalidated Texas' criminal
abortion laws."3 In Roe the Court held that a state's restrictions on
regulations and had not upheld them. Id. at 1265 & n.4. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Colo. 1988), preliminary injunction granted, 687 F. Supp. 540 (D.
Colo. 1988), permanent injunction affd, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990); Massachusetts v.
Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1988), injunction granted aff'd, 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990).
6. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 404. Dr. Louis Sullivan became the defendant by
succeeding Otis R. Bowen as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. at
401
7. Id. at 404. The court of appeals held that the regulations were authorized by the Act
and that they did not violate the First Amendment or a woman's privacy right to an abortion. Id.
at 407, 411-12.
8. Rust v. Sullivan, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990); New York v. Sullivan, 110 S. Ct. 2559
(1990).
9. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (1991). The First and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeal invalidated the regulations, principally on constitutional grounds. Massachusetts v. Bowen,
899 F.2d 53, 65 (lst Cir. 1990); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492,
1498-1504 (10th Cir. 1990).
10. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the ma-
jority opinion. Justices White, Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dis-
senting opinion in which Justices Marshall, O'Connor, and Stevens each joined in various parts.
Id. at 1764.
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). See infra notes 18-65 and accompanying text.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court determined that the right to have an abortion is a
fundamental right. Id. at 153.
"Abortion regulation was a matter exclusively for the state legislatures until 1973, when the
United States Supreme Court brought medically indicated abortions within the protection of the
UALR LAW JOURNAL
abortions are invalid unless they are justified by a compelling state in-
terest.' 4 In the years following Roe a pattern emerged. State legisla-
tures enacted "abortion" legislation, a suit was brought to enjoin en-
forcement of the legislation, and the Supreme Court routinely
invalidated the legislation. 15 Although those state laws were generally
not attempts to prohibit abortion, they did place "conditions on their
performance,"' 6 which the Court felt "effectively impaired a woman's
freedom of choice."' 7
One issue that Roe v. Wade did not address was the rights of third
parties, such as spouses, parents, and putative fathers, in the abortion
decision. 18 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth9 the Supreme Court
considered a Missouri statute requiring written consent of a woman's
spouse or of a parent of an unmarried woman under age eighteen
before performing an abortion.20 The Court invalidated the statute,
concluding that "the State does not have the constitutional authority to
give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's
pregnancy.""
In Colautti v. Franklin22 the Supreme Court examined the validity
of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, which required physicians to
determine the viability of the fetus.21 If viability was likely, the physi-
cian was required to exercise the same standard of care with respect to
fourteenth amendment in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton." B.J. George, Jr., State Legislatures
Versus the Supreme Court: Abortion Legislation in the 1980's, 12 PEPP. L. REV., 427, 429 (1985)
(footnotes omitted).
In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court invalidated a Georgia criminal statute
requiring, inter alia, that abortions be performed in hospitals, approved by an abortion committee,
and confirmed as necessary by two doctors in addition to the performing doctor. Id. at 184.
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. The Court determined that in protecting the health of
the mother, the state's interest becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester, and as to the
interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus, the state's interest becomes compelling at the
point of viability. Id.
15. "[Sltate efforts to regulate abortion rarely have survived the Court's scrutiny." Theo-
dore C. Hirt, Commentary, Why the Government is Not Required to Subsidize Abortion Coun-
seling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895, 1897 (1988) (footnote omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Mark E. Chopko, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: A Path to Constitutional
Equilibrium, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 186 (1990) (footnote omitted).
19. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
20. Id. at 58.
21. Id. at 74.
22. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
23. Id. at 382.
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the potentially viable fetus as he was required to exercise with respect
to the mother.2 ' This Act was struck down as unconstitutionally
vague."5
The Supreme Court continued its strict review of "abortion" stat-
utes in Bellotti v. Baird.2 In Bellotti the Court invalidated a Massa-
chusetts statute requiring minors seeking an abortion to obtain the con-
sent of both parents or a superior court judge.2 7 The Court applied the
same reasoning used in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth28 and deter-
mined that it was inappropriate to give a third party veto power over
the decision of a physician and his patient to terminate a pregnancy. 29
In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health3 0 the Supreme
Court invalidated an Ohio ordinance regulating abortion. The ordi-
nance required that abortions after the first trimester be performed in a
hospital, 3 1 that minors under the age of fifteen obtain parental consent
for an abortion, 2 that information be disclosed regarding fetal develop-
ment33 and alternatives to abortion," ' and that fetal remains be dis-
posed of in a humane and sanitary manner.3 5 The ordinance also re-
quired a twenty-four hour waiting period before the abortion could be
performed.3 " The Court invalidated the informed consent portion of the
ordinance, because it concluded that such requirements were designed
to influence a woman's choice between childbirth and abortion. 7
The Supreme Court in Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists"8 invalidated the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act which required: informed consent, 9 distribution of de-
tailed printed state material regarding risks and alternatives, 40 a cer-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 401.
26. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
27. Id. at 643.
28. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
29. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 643.
30. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
31. Id. at 422.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 423.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 424.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 444.
38. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
39. Id. at 759-60.
40. Id. at 761.
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tain standard of care with respect to the potentially viable fetus,4 and
the presence of a second doctor when an abortion was performed on a
potentially viable fetus.42 Again, the Court reasoned that the informed
consent provisions were designed to influence a woman's choice be-
tween abortion and childbirth. 3
The preceding cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's resistance
to attempts by state legislatures to impose restrictions on abortions.4
However, the Court has been more tolerant toward such restrictions in
two areas.' 5 The first is abortion funding. Here, the Court has "distin-
guished between direct interference with a woman's right to choose
abortion and the indirect deterrence of the abortion choice' 64 by fund-
ing childbirth and not abortion.' 7 For example, in Maher v. Roe,4 the
Court upheld a Connecticut welfare regulation which provided medi-
caid recipients with payments for medical services related to childbirth,
but denied payments for nontherapeutic abortions.' 9 Similarly, in Har-
ris v. McRae50 the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment which prohibits
public funding of certain medically indicated abortions.5 1 The Court
also has upheld state laws requiring parental notification before a mi-
nor could receive an abortion, even though such laws have a restrictive
effect on abortions. 2
41. Id. at 768.
42. Id. at 769-72.
43. Id. at 762. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, said:
[Olur cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a cer-
tain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of govern-
ment . . . .Few decisions are more personal and intimate . . . than a woman's decision
whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is
fundamental.
Id. at 772 (citations omitted).
Justice Burger, in his dissent, stated, "[w]e have apparently already passed the point at which
abortion is available merely on demand. If the statute at issue here is to be invalidated, the 'de-
mand' will not even have to be the result of an informed choice." Id. at 783-84 (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
44. See supra notes 18-43 and accompanying text.
45. Chopko, supra note 18, at 183 n.5.
46. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 16 (1990) [hereinafter TRIBE].
47. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 16.
48. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
49. Id. at 465-66, 474.
50. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
51. Id. at 322-23.
52. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a Utah statute requiring
parental notification, if possible, prior to a minor getting an abortion). Id. at 399-400, 409-1I. The
Court distinguished this case from those cases invalidating parental consent requirements on the
basis that a notification requirement does not give the parents a blanket veto power over the
[Vol. 14:557
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Despite these two exceptions, the Court generally overturned di-
rect restrictions on abortions5 3 until Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services."' The five-to-four decision in Webster, which upheld a Mis-
souri statute regulating abortion,5 5 marked a turning point in the Su-
preme Court's approach to abortion restrictions.56 At the most basic
level, Webster suggests that the Supreme Court is now more willing to
uphold state laws regulating abortion.
Although the Webster opinion is badly fragmented,5 7 it is apparent
that the Justices did not reach their various conclusions through appli-
cation of the traditional strict scrutiny standard of review." Three Jus-
tices applied a rational basis standard to the viability portion of the
regulations, 59 Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, argued for applica-
tion of the "undue burden" standard, and Justice Scalia in his concur-
rence rejected both standards of review and argued that this case pro-
vided the opportunity to reconsider and overturn Roe. 0 It is difficult to
ascertain what standard the Supreme Court will use in assessing future
physician and patient's decision. Id. at 411 & n.17.
53. TRIBE, supra note 46, at 16.
54. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
55. Id. at 500-01. The statute: (1) sets forth "findings" that life begins at conception, un-
born children have protectable interests, and all state laws shall be interpreted to provide unborn
children with the same rights enjoyed by other persons; (2) requires a doctor who believes a fetus
is twenty or more weeks old to perform a variety of tests to determine viability; (3) prohibits the
use of public employees and facilities in performing or assisting with abortions not necessary to
save the life of the mother; and (4) makes it unlawful to use public funds, employees, or facilities
for the purpose of "encouraging or counseling" a woman to have a nontherapeutic abortion. Id.
56. Lynn D. Wardle, "Time Enough": Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and the
Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 FLA. L. REv. 881, 883 (1989).
57. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 498-99, 522, 532, 537, 560. Chief
Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unani--
mous Court with respect to Part I-C, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts 1, I1-A, and
II-B, in which Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined, and an opinion with respect
to parts lI-D and Ill, in which Justices White and Kennedy joined. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Blackmun filed an opin-
ion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
58. Id. at 520-21, 529-30 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 532-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 520-21. "The Missouri testing requirement here is reasonably designed to ensure
that abortions are not performed where the fetus is viable . . . and that is sufficient to sustain its
constitutionality." Id. at 520 (Rehnquist, C. J., White, J., Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 529-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under the undue burden test, "an abortion
regulation is subject to the deferential rational basis test unless it unduly burdens a woman's right
to choose abortion, in which case it is subject to strict scrutiny." Summary and Analysis, 60
U.S.L.W. 1065 (Oct. 29, 1991).
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:557
abortion regulations.6"
In 1990, Hodgson v. Minnesota62 and Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health63 gave the Court the opportunity to consider and
uphold two more state abortion statutes. Hodgson and Akron both in-
volved parental notification requirements, 4 and they stand for the pro-
position that as long as the state-enacted regulations are reasonable
and are in response to a legitimate state interest the Court will uphold
them.65
In Rust v. Sullivan"' the Supreme Court was asked to determine
the constitutionality of an action taken by a coequal branch of the po-
litical system, in this case the executive branch. The Court continued
its recent trend by upholding the regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary construing Title X of the Public Health Services Act.6 The regu-
lations prohibit abortion-related activities by Title X funded clinics.6 8
The Court systematically considered and rejected each of plaintiffs' ar-
guments, concluding that the regulations were authorized by the Act69
and could be implemented without infringing upon constitutionally pro-
61. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), the Third Circuit faced
the question of whether it should apply strict scrutiny to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act
after Webster. The Court reasoned that "the controlling opinion in a splintered decision is that of
the justice[s] concurring on the 'narrowest ground.' " Id. at 693 (citing Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977)). Because the narrowest concurring opinion in Webster was Justice O'Conner's
undue burden standard, the Third Circuit concluded that the undue burden standard is the appro-
priate standard to apply in deciding abortion regulation cases. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947
F.2d at 694-97 (3d Cir. 1991).
The Eighth Circuit has also determined that Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard is the
appropriate standard to apply when determining the constitutionality of an abortion regulation.
Coe v. Melahn, No. 90-1552, 1992 WL 37328 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 1992) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of a Missouri statute regulating insurance coverage for elective abortions).
62. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
63. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990).
64. The statute in Hodgson required the performing physician to give notice to both living
parents at least forty-eight hours before an abortion is performed on a minor. Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2930-31 (1990). The statute at issue in Ohio v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health required an unemancipated minor's physician to give notice to one of her parents
before performing an abortion. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2977
(1990). Both statutes have a judicial bypass provision. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. at 2933;
Ohio v. Akron, 110 S. Ct. at 2977-78.
65. Sue G. Graziano, Parental Notification and a Minor's Right to an Abortion After
Hodgson & Akron 11, 17 OHIo N. U. L. REV. 581, 597 (1990).
66. Rust v. Sullivan, 11l S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
67. Id. at 1764.
68. Id. at 1765-66.
69. Id. at 1767-71.
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tected rights.7"
The Court initially considered whether the regulations exceeded
the Secretary's authority under Title X and whether they were arbi-
trary and capricious.7" First, the Court addressed the regulations
prohibiting abortion counseling, referral, and advocacy, 2 and second,
the regulations requiring separate facilities, personnel, and records.7"
The Court began by looking to the plain language of the Act.74
The majority of the courts which have considered the plain language of
42 U.S.C. § 600a-6 have agreed that the language is ambiguous and
does not address the issues of counseling, referral, advocacy, or pro-
gram integrity.
75
The Court then analyzed whether the regulations were authorized
by the Act under the Chevron standard. 76 The Court looked to the leg-
islative history to determine if the regulations pertaining to counseling,
referral, and advocacy were based on a permissible construction of the
Act.77 It found that the history was ambiguous as to those issues and
70. Id. at 1771-78. "[Tlhe challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [the regulations] might operate unconstitution-
ally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render [them] wholly invalid."
Id. at 1767 (quoting U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
71. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1767.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1769.
74. Id. at 1767. The statute states that, "None of the funds appropriated under this sub-
chapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." 42 U.S.C. §
600a-6 (1988).
75. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1767. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990); Massachusetts v. Bowen, 899 F.2d 53, 59 (1st
Cir. 1990); New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
76. Id. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
In Chevron the Court upheld the Environmental Protection Agency's construction of the term
"'stationary source" in the Clean Air Act Amendments. Id. at 841-42. The Court articulated the
following test for determining if an agency's construction of a statute, which it administers, is
authorized: (1) Did Congress speak directly to the question at issue? If Congress' intent is clear,
then the agency and the Court must abide by that intent. Id. at 842-43. (2) If Congress is silent
or ambiguous as to the specific issue, then the Court must determine whether the agency's inter-
pretation of the Act is based on a permissible construction of the act. Id. at 843. (3) The agency's
interpretation is considered permissible unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to
the Statute." Id. at 844.
77. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1768. The plaintiffs relied on portions of the legislative
history to support their arguments that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary did not
represent congressional intent:
The committee does not view family planning as merely a euphemism for birth
control. It is properly a part of comprehensive health care and should consist of much
more than the dispensation of contraceptive devices . . . .[A] successful family plan-
ning program must contain ... [m]edical services, including consultation, examina-
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failed to "shed light on relevant congressional intent."78 This was con-
sistent with the findings of lower courts which also analyzed the legisla-
tive history of the Act.79 After concluding that the statutory language
and legislative history were ambiguous as to Congress' intent, the
Court indicated that under Chevron it would normally defer to the in-
terpretation of the agency administering the Act.
81
The Court rejected petitioners' arguments that the Secretary's
"regulations are entitled to little or no deference because they 'reverse
tion, prescription, and continuing supervision, supplies, instruction, and referral to other
medical services as needed.
Id. at 1768 n.3 (quoting S. REP. No. 1004, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970)).
The defendants also relied on portions of legislative history to support their contentions that
the regulations promulgated by the Secretary do reflect congressional intent.
This legislation is designed to make comprehensive, voluntary family planning ser-
vices, and information relating thereto, readily available to all persons in the United
States desiring such services; to provide greatly increased support for biomedical, be-
havioral, and operational research relevant to family planning and population; to de-
velop and disseminate information on population growth; and to coordinate and central-
ize the administration of family planning and population.research programs conducted
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 408 (quoting S. REP. No. 1004, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1970)).
It is, and has been, the intent of both Houses that the funds authorized under this
legislation be used only to support preventive family planning services, population re-
search, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and educational
activities. The conferees have adopted the language contained in section 1008, which
prohibits the use of such funds for abortion, in order to make clear this intent. The
legislation does not and is not intended to interfere with or limit programs conducted in
accordance with State or local laws and regulations which are supported by funds other
than those authorized under this legislation.
New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1266 (quoting S. CONF. REP. No. 1667, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
8-9 (1970), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068, 5081-82 (1970)).
"[Tihis legislation does not provide for abortions contrary to some of the rumors apparently
circulating concerning it." Id. at 1266 n.5 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 37,367 (1970) (remarks of
Rep. Nelson)).
"[I] strongly support . . . the provision in the House version of this legislation that prevents
this bill from being construed as support for abortion." Id. (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 37,371
(1970) (remarks of Rep. Pickle)).
Congress "wisely prohibited the use of any Federal funds in the bill from being used for
abortion." Id. at 1266 n.5 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 37,375 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill)).
"With the 'prohibition of abortion' amendment-title X, section 1008-the committee mem-
bers clearly intend that abortion is not to be encouraged or promoted in any way through this
legislation." Id. at 1265 n.5 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 37,375 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Dingell)).
78. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1768.
79. See Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 1990); Planned Parenthood v.
Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990); New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 407 (2nd
Cir. 1989).
80. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1768.
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a longstanding agency policy that permitted nondirective counseling
and referral for abortion.' "81 The Court relied on the Secretary's asser-
tions that reports from the General Accounting Office and the Office of
the Inspector General indicated that the new regulations were neces-
sary because the prior policy failed to properly implement the statute,
"the new regulations [were] more in keeping with the original intent of
the statute, [were] justified by client experience under the prior policy,
and [were] supported by a shift in attitude against the 'elimination of
unborn children by abortion.' "'8
The Court took a similar analytical approach in considering
whether the program integrity requirements-separate facilities, per-
sonnel, and records-were a permissible construction of the Act.83 The
Court determined that the program integrity requirements were not in-
consistent with the plain language of Title X, 8  and the legislative his-
tory was unclear as to Congress' intent in that regard. 85
Because neither the plain language of the Act nor the legislative
history was determinative, the Court considered whether the amended
regulations were necessary to assure proper implementation of the
Act.8" The Court relied on the Secretary's contention that it is neces-
sary for nonapproved activities to take place in facilities separate from
81. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 20, New York v. Sullivan, I l I S. Ct. 1759) (No.
89-1392). In Chevron the regulations at issue were promulgated in 1981 by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") when a new administration took office. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41.
The regulations constituted a change from the regulations put in effect in 1980. Id. The Court
rejected respondent's argument "that the EPA's interpretation is not entitled to deference because
it represents a sharp break with prior interpretation of the Act." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862. The
Court held that "an initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary,
the agency, to engage in informed rule making, must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis." Id. at 863-64.
82. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1769. The prior regulations directed in part, that:
[plregnant women should be offered information and counseling regarding their
pregnancies. Those requesting information on options for the management of an unin-
tended pregnancy are to be given non-directive counseling on the following alternative
courses of action and referral upon request:
- Prenatal care and delivery
- Infant care, foster care or adoption and
- Pregnancy termination
New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1270 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES § 8.6 (1981)).
83. Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. at 1770-71.
84. Id. at 1769.
85. Id. at 1769-70. "[Llegislative history which does not demonstrate a clear and certain
congressional intent cannot form the basis for enjoining the regulations." Id. at 1770. See Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
86. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1769-70.
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the personnel and records of approved activities.17 The Secretary con-
tended that separation is necessary to prevent the use of federal funds
for abortion-related activities or the appearance that federal funds are
being used for abortion-related activities.88 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that the Secretary's decision to promulgate new regulations was
based on a "reasoned determination that the program integrity require-
ments [were] necessary to implement the prohibition."89
The Court then addressed the petitioners' final statutory construc-
tion argument, namely that the regulations should be invalidated be-
cause they raise questions of constitutional law.9" The Court noted that
any regulations the Secretary might have issued would have been chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds.91 Although the Court admitted that
the petitioners' constitutional arguments had some validity, it con-
cluded that "they [did] not carry the day."92
Turning to the petitioners' constitutional arguments against the
regulations, the Court considered whether the regulations violated the
First Amendment93 and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.94
Petitioners asserted that the regulations violated the First Amendment
by compelling viewpoint-based suppression of speech. 95 In rejecting this
argument, the Court found the Act itself constitutional,9" being a per-
missible exercise of the government's authority under Maher97 and Mc-
87. ld.
88. Id. at 1769.
89. Id. at 1770-71.
90. Id. at 1771. "[Als between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save
the Act." Id. (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)). "A statute must be con-
strued, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also
grave doubts upon that score." Id. (quoting United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401
(1915)).
91. Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. at 1771.
92. Id.
93. Id. US. CONST. amend. I provides, "Congress shall make no law . ..abridging the
freedom of speech .... "
94. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1776. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides, "No person shall
be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
95. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1772. "The regulations prohibit all discussion about
abortion as a lawful option-including counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and accu-
rate information about ending a pregnancy-while compelling the clinic or counselor to provide
information that promotes continuing a pregnancy to term." Id. at 1771-72 (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at II, Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1751 (1991) (No. 89-1391)).
96. Id. at 1772.
97. Id. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Rae.98 It is not a constitutional violation to fund a program that deals
with a situation in one way and not to fund a program that deals with
it in an alternative way.99 The regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary are simply an implementation of the prohibitions within the
Act."' 0 They are necessary to ensure that Title X grantees and their
staffs do not engage in activities outside the scope of the program. 10 ' In
addition, the Court asserted that "when the government appropriates
public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of
that program.' 0 2
The Court then dismissed as inaccurate plaintiffs' claim that the
regulations would prohibit a Title X project from referring a woman
whose pregnancy placed her life in danger to a provider of abortion
services. 03 The Court reasoned that in those cases the potential abor-
tion would not serve as a "method of family planning," and therefore
the Act would not apply.10 4 In addition, the Court pointed out that two
provisions in the regulations specifically provide for "referral" when
medically necessary. 0 5
Continuing its First Amendment analysis, the Court next consid-
ered the petitioners' argument that the proposed regulations "condition
the receipt of a benefit, in this case Title X funding, on the relinquish-
ment of a constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion advocacy
and counseling.' 0 6 The Court rejected this argument, stating that Title
98. 1I1 S. Ct. at 1772. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
99. 111 S. Ct. at 1772. In Maher the Court held that the government may "make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation
of public funds." Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
100. Rust v. Sullivan, I l l S. Ct. at 1772. "The Title X program is designed not for prena-
tal care, but to encourage family planning." Id.
101. Id. at 1772-73. "A doctor who wished to offer prenatal care to a project patient who
became pregnant could properly be prohibited from doing so because such service is outside the
scope of the federally funded program." Id. at 1772.
102. Id. at 1773.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. "Section 59.8(a)(2) provides a specific exemption for emergency care and requires
Title X recipients 'to refer the client immediately to an appropriate provider of emergency medi-
cal services.' 42 C.F.R. § 59(a)(2) (1989). Section 59.5(b)(1) also requires Title X projects to
provide 'necessary referral to other medical facilities when medically indicated.' " Rust v. Sulli-
van, III S. Ct. at 1773 (footnotes omitted).
106. Id. at 1774. Petitioners relied on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), which
states that "even though the government may deny [a] benefit for any number of reasons, there
are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially, his interest in freedom
of speech." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597. Petitioners also relied on FCC v. League of
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X grantees10 7 and their staffs were not required by the regulations to
relinquish their constitutional right to engage in abortion advocacy and
counseling; "they merely require that the grantee keep such activities
separate and distinct from" the Title X program. 10 8
For support, the Court relied on its ruling in Regan v. Taxation
with Representation."9 In Regan the Court upheld an Internal Reve-
nue Service statute which grants tax exemption to certain charitable
organizations as long as "no substantial part of the activities of which
is . . . attempting to influence legislation."" ' The Court determined
that this did not infringe on the First Amendment rights of the affected
organizations; they simply chose not to pay for lobbying.' The organi-
zations were free to form a nonlobbying subsidiary which would then
be eligible for tax exempt status.' 2 Similarly, in Rust the Court as-
serted that Congress had not denied Title X grantees the right to per-
form abortion-related activities; it simply chose not to fund them." 3
The Court acknowledged that there are limits on the government's
right to inhibit expression within subsidized activities," 4 but, in the
Court's judgment, those limits would not be reached by application of
the Secretary's regulations." 5
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), in which the Court refused to uphold the Public Broadcast-
ing Act of 1967, which prohibited noncommercial educational broadcasting stations that receive
federal grants from engaging in editorializing. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402.
"The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that the government may not grant a bene-
fit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold the benefit altogether." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
107. "'Grantee' means the organization to which a grant is awarded . 42 C.F.R. §
59.2 (1991).
"'Program' and 'project' are used interchangeably and mean a coherent assembly of plans,
activities and supporting resources contained within an administrative framework." Id. See also
Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1774.
108. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1774. The Court distinguishes Rust from unconstitu-
tional conditions cases on the basis that in the latter a condition is placed on the recipient which
prohibits the recipient from engaging in the activity inside or outside the scope of the federally
funded program, while in Rust the constitutionally protected activity is only prohibited within the
narrow scope of the Title X program. Id.
109. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
110. Id. at 542 n.I.
Ill. Id. at 546.
112. Id.
113. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1775.
114. Id. at 1776. Areas where the Court recognized a limited right to condition speech
include areas traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, areas expressly dedicated to
speech activities and universities. Id.
115. Id.
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The Court next considered petitioners' claim that the proposed
regulations violated a woman's Fifth Amendment right to choose
whether to terminate her pregnancy, 1 ' her right to medical self-deter-
mination, and her right to make informed medical decisions free of
governmental-imposed harm."' The Court first observed that "the Due
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual.""' Applying this principle, the Court reasoned that since
the government is under no duty to fund a woman's constitutional right
to an abortion, 9 the government's decision not to fund abortions did
not place an obstacle in a woman's path to an abortion. 2 Thus, a wo-
man still has all of the alternatives she would have if the government
did not provide any funded health care clinics. 2
Finally, the Court concluded that a woman's Fifth Amendment
rights to medical self-determination and to make informed medical de-
cisions free of governmentally imposed harm were not violated by the
restrictions placed on the doctor-patient relationship and the flow of
medical information. 2 The Court reasoned that "a doctor's ability to
provide, and a woman's right to receive, information concerning abor-
tion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X
project remained unfettered."'123 The Court acknowledged the petition-
ers' argument that many of the women using the services of Title X
clinics will be financially constrained from going to a health care pro-
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1777.
118. Id. at 1776 (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs. 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3042
(1989)). See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315 (1980).
119. Rust v. Sullivan I I S. Ct. at 1776. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. at 3052.
120. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1776. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
121. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1777.
122. Id. Petitioners argued that under Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Ser-
vices, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), the "government cannot interfere with a woman's right to make an
informed and voluntary choice by placing restrictions on the patient/doctor dialogue." Rust v.
Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1777.
123. Rust v. Sullivan, I I S. Ct. at 1777. The majority argued that the facts in Rust were
not analogous to Akron or Thornburgh on this point because the restrictions in those cases applied
to all doctors and pregnant patients in the controlling jurisdictions. The proposed regulations at




vider that provides abortion-related services."' However, the Court
concluded that if indigent women are restricted from exercising their
constitutionally protected rights it is because of their indigency, rather
than governmental restrictions. 12 5
Justice Blackmun wrote a strongly worded dissent which was
joined by Justice Marshall and joined in part by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor. 2 ' He concluded that the regulations of referral, advocacy,
and counseling activities exceeded the Secretary's authority and vio-
lated the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. 127
In making his determination that the regulations exceeded the
Secretary's statutory authority, 2 8 Justice Blackmun looked to the rule
of statutory construction that statutes should be construed in a way to
avoid raising questions regarding their constitutionality. 29 It was obvi-
ous, in Justice Blackmun's view, that the regulations raised doubts re-
garding their constitutionality. The regulations raised the question of
the extent to which the government can impose otherwise unconstitu-
tional conditions on the receipt of public funding. He concluded that
they imposed viewpoint-based suppression of speech and that they were
directed at a woman's choice regarding abortion.1 30 The significant im-
plications of these issues, and "the fact that two of the three Courts of
Appeal that have entertained challenges to the Regulations have invali-
dated them on constitutional grounds," makes the argument that they
do not raise constitutional questions implausible. 31
Justice Blackmun observed that viewpoint-based and content-
based suppression of speech are not proper conditions of government
funding. 132 Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's contention that
the restrictions on speech are necessary to keep the activities of the
Title X grantees and their staffs within the scope of the Title X pro-
gram, which is family planning and therefore preconception. 133 Justice
Blackmun pointed out that Title X clinics are encouraged to engage in
124. Id. at 1778.
125. Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)).
126. Id. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. See also United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); Hooper v. Califor-
nia, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895).
130. Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. at 1778-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1779 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 9.
132. III S. Ct. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1781 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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many postconception activities, 34 while being prohibited from engaging
in the postconception activities related to abortion.13 5
Justice Blackmun also rejected the majority's argument that the
First Amendment rights of Title X grantees and their staffs were not
violated because the prohibitions on their freedom of expression were
limited to the context of their Title X employment.' 6 He reasoned that
the logical extension of that reasoning would be to uphold any govern-
mental restriction as long as it was limited to a federally funded work
place.3 7 "[lI]t is beyond question 'that a government may not require
an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amend-
ment as a condition of public employment.' "138 Conditions such as
those imposed by the Secretary's regulations require the Court to bal-
ance the speaker's interest in uninhibited speech against the govern-
ment's interest in suppressing speech. 3 9 To Justice Blackmun, the in-
terest of Title X counselors in providing complete information to their
clients far outweighs the government's interest in using federal funds
for Title X approved purposes." In addition, the government's interest
134. Id. at 1781-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Title X projects are required to facilitate access to prenatal care and social ser-
vices, including adoption services, that might be needed by the pregnant client to pro-
mote her well-being and that of her child, while making it abundantly clear that the
project is not permitted to promote abortion by facilitating access to abortion through
the referral process.
Id. at 1781 (quoting 53 FED. REG. 2927 (1988)).
Justice Blackmun noted that the regulations command that a project refer for prenatal care
each woman diagnosed as pregnant, irrespective of the woman's expressed desire to continue or
terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 1781 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1991)).
"In addition to requiring referral for prenatal care and adoption services, the regulations
permit general health services such as physical examinations, screening for breast cancer, treat-
ment of gynecological problems, and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases." Id. at 1781 n.2
(citing 53 FED. REG. 2927 (1988)).
135. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1781 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "If a client asks di-
rectly about abortion, a Title X physician or counselor is required to say, in essence, that the
project does not consider abortion to be an appropriate method of family planning." Id. (citing 42
C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(4) (1991)).
136. Id. at 1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 1782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Abood v. Detroit Board of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 234 (1977)).
139. Id. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384
(1987).
140. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The physician has an
ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consis-
tent with good medical practice." Id. (quoting CURRENT OPINIONS, THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 8.08 (1989)). See also PRESI-
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could have been satisfied by more narrow means, such as stringent
bookkeeping rules to ensure financial separation or "content neutral
rules for the balanced dissemination of family-planning and health
information."'41
Justice Blackmun concluded by arguing that the regulations vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment rights of Title X clinic patients, specifically
the "right of a pregnant woman to be free from affirmative governmen-
tal interference in her decision" whether to terminate her pregnancy." 2
By limiting or distorting the abortion-related information available to a
pregnant woman entering a Title X clinic, in Justice Blackmun's view,
the majority abandoned the longstanding principle that a woman's de-
cision whether to continue her pregnancy to term should be free from
coercion, 14 3 thus placing "formidable obstacles" in her path when she is
contemplating whether to continue her pregnancy. 144 Justice Blackmun
rejected the majority's attempt to distinguish the facts of this case from
those in Akron and Thornburgh, which struck down regulations placing
restrictions on the doctor-patient relationship between all doctors and
their patients in their controlling jurisdictions. 14 He asserted that "for
the individual woman, the deprivation of liberty by the Government is
no less substantial because it affects few rather than many. "146
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, joined Justice Blackmun's
constitutional arguments against the validity of the regulations. 1"7 Jus-
tice Stevens added that the majority did not pay "sufficient attention to
the language of the controlling statute or to the consistent interpreta-
tion accorded the statute by the responsible cabinet officers during four
different Presidencies and 18 years.' 48 He said that the statute never
authorized the Secretary to restrict the provision of information or ad-
vice.' 49 On the contrary, the Act is directed at the prohibition of con-
DENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 70 (1982); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRICS-GYNECOLOGIC SERVICES 62 (7th
ed. 1989).
141. Rust v. Sullivan, IIl S. Ct. at 1783-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Massachusetts
v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 74 (Ist' Cir. 1990).
142. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1784-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
146. Rust v. Sullivan, I1I S. Ct. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1786-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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duct, that is, abortion, and not the provision of information and advice.
He noted that in 1971 and 1986 the Secretary issued regulations pursu-
ant to the Act that prohibited conduct, not speech. 150 In his view, the
new regulations "represent[] an assumption of policymaking responsi-
bility that Congress [has] not delegated to the Secretary." 151Justice O'Connor also joined Justice Blackmun's dissent as to the
invalidity of the regulations on the grounds that they raise constitu-
tional questions, 52 but stopped short of concluding that the regulations
were unconstitutional. She stated that "[i]t is a fundamental rule of
judicial restraint . . . that this Court will not reach constitutional ques-
tions in advance of the necessity of deciding them."153 Justice
O'Connor believed it was necessary only to decide that the regulations
were not a reasonable interpretation of the statute; the constitutional
questions should not have been decided until Congress raised them.154
The Supreme Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan is significant on
several fronts: its impact on Roe v. Wade, the expansion of the govern-
ment's right to condition funding on the restriction of First Amend-
ment rights, the effect on the doctor-patient relationship, and the role
of the current Supreme Court majority in American jurisprudence. For
everyone, prolife and prochoice advocates alike, this is a decision with
potentially far-reaching effects.1 55
This decision further erodes the fundamental right to abortion es-
tablished in Roe. Although the majority characterizes Rust as nothing
more than a funding case, and therefore merely an application of the
rules previously set forth in Maher and McRae, such a characterization
is an oversimplification. Rust is another demonstration of the current
majority's willingness to apply something less than strict scrutiny in its
review of restrictive abortion measures.15 '
Abortion cases will continue to reach the Supreme Court, and the
current majority likely will continue to defer to the restrictions promul-
150. Id. at 1787-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'r, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984). See also
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295
(1905); Liverpool v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1895).
154. Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155. "1 think this goes beyond an issue of abortion, pro-life, pro-choice controversy, and
involves elements of freedom of speech and medical practice as well." Julie Rovner, Abortion
Counseling Stalled by Parental Notification, CONG. Q., June 15, 1991, at 1586 (quoting House
Speaker Thomas S. Foley).
156. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
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gated by legislatures and executive agencies, as it did here. As long as
such restrictions are "reasonably" designed to affect a "compelling
state interest," such as in this case, the compelling interest of the gov-
ernment to spend its money in a particular way, the Court likely will
uphold them. Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Webster, argued that
this standard is nothing more than a rational basis test, which is the
most lenient level of scrutiny. 157 Although, Roe may or may not offi-
cially be overruled in the future, the right the Court articulated in Roe
as fundamental may be placed back into the hands of the states.158
In this case the Supreme Court found it permissible to restrict ex-
pression in a government-funded program 59 because the prohibition
was limited to Title X programs, and the parties affected, that is, the
Title X grantees and their staffs, can exercise all of their constitution-
ally protected rights outside of the narrowly-defined Title X pro-
gram. 60 While this is true, Rust is still an extension of the restrictions
the government has placed on speech in the past.' "It [is] difficult to
predict the ruling's implications" for other programs dependent on gov-
ernment funding. 6 2 "Under the majority's reasoning, the First Amend-
ment could be read to tolerate any governmental restriction upon an
employee's speech so long as that restriction is limited to the funded
workplace. This is a dangerous proposition, and one the Court has
rightly rejected in the past. 163
Historically, the doctor-patient relationship has been considered a
privileged relationship. Rust permits a significant invasion of this rela-
tionship. The Court offered two primary justifications for the intrusion:
(1) the doctor can communicate freely outside of the Title X project;'
and (2) the doctor-patient relationship established by Title X is not
"all-encompassing;" therefore, the patient is aware of the restriction
when she goes to a Title X clinic, or she will be told of the restriction if
157. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 555 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
158. "While technically leaving intact the fundamental right protected by Roe v. Wade, the
Court ...once again has rendered the right's substance nugatory." Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct.
at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at
537, 560).
159. Id. at 1775-76.
160. Id.
161. See Joan Biskupic, Power of the Purse, CONG. Q., May 25, 1991, at 1376.
162. Id.
163. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).




The proposed regulations state that the government does not con-
sider abortion an appropriate method of family planning. The govern-
ment pays for part of the doctor's services; therefore, the doctor cannot
discuss abortion with his patients.1"6 Each time a person goes to the
doctor, does he or she have to ask: "Is this clinic, hospital, or doctor
federally subsidized?" If the answer is yes, does the individual need to
determine what methods of treatment the government or current Su-
preme Court finds unacceptable, so that the patient will know that the
medical information conveyed may not be a complete reflection of the
doctor's knowledge? 67 That is a ludicrous proposition, but it is exactly
the proposition that a pregnant woman who enters a Title X clinic is
faced with as a result of the Rust decision.
When people see a doctor, they assume that the doctor will fully
inform them. Where is that trust now? Could the Court's reasoning be
extended to other federally funded privileged relationships such as the
attorney-client relationship in a federal agency? Can the government
tell an attorney that he cannot fully inform a client of his or her legal
rights regarding a matter the government does not find appropriate?
Apart from the abortion issue, this decision is significant as an-
other indication of the judicial philosophy of the current Supreme
Court majority.16 8 In the name of judicial restraint, the Court is taking
a more passive stance in deferring to other branches. It no longer sees
itself as an active force set to shape public policy, but rather as a mod-
erator or a peacekeeper to ensure that the executive and legislative
branches do not go too far astray. Rust is an indication of the Court's
now almost routine way of finding the interests of the executive and
165. Id. at 1776 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. On March 20, 1992, William R. Archer III, deputy assistant secretary of Health
and Human Services, issued a memorandum to regional administrators of the family planning
program-which states that doctors in federally funded clinics may discuss abortion with patients in
limited circumstances. This directive will not affect most clinics because non-physicians provide
most of the health care to clinic patients under a physicians supervision. The directive also stated
that Health and Human Services will begin enforcing the amended regulations which were issued
on February 2, 1988. Julie Rovner, Counseling Memo Nothing New, But Rules No Longer in
Limbo, CONG. Q., March 28, 1992, at 807.
167. "[T]he government policy, if left unchallenged could lead to further interference in the
doctor-patient relationship." Henry J. Reske & Mark Hansen, House Reacts to Rust Decision,
ABA JOURNAL, October 1991, at 108 (quoting Dr. Daniel Johnson, Speaker of the American
Medical Association's House of Delegates).
168. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43
(1989).
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judicial branch sufficiently compelling to survive constitutional chal-
lenges. This shift in emphasis will continue to affect the outcome of
every case the Court hears.
Marti S. Toennies
